The recent emergence of the Euro, combined with the completion of a decade of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has sparked interest in adopting a common currency for North America. This study examines the likelihood that Canada, Mexico, and the United States will adopt a common currency under fixed exchange rate regimes. The benefits and costs of a common currency are explored using the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). Empirical research focuses on several variables including intra-regional and intra-industry trade, trade openness, gross domestic product, inflation rates, interest rates, economic growth rates, business cycle synchronization, factor mobility, fiscal policy and monetary policy coordination. The analysis also presents a comparative analysis of NAFTA with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) nations on different economic criteria. Finally, correlation and regression analysis further explores the likelihood that members of NAFTA will economically integrate. Though this research concludes that it is economically feasible for NAFTA members to move towards a common currency, this venture depends on the political readiness of the nations. 
Introduction
The recent emergence of the Euro, the common currency of several European countries, has sparked interest in monetary union amongst Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The Euro has given the United States an incentive towards a common currency as it has become a rival to the U.S. dollar's market leadership throughout the world as the leading international currency. Though the U.S. dollar, also known as the greenback, is "indisputably the market leader among world monies," 1 the Euro has become a recent threat to its power. The U.S. dollar accounts for nearly half the value in which the world's exports are invoiced while the Euro accounts for roughly 15 percent of the exports. This article examines the likelihood that Canada, the United States and Mexico will adopt a common currency under fixed exchange rate regimes based on economic benefits and costs.
Unlike the majority of past research on North American common currency, which focuses primarily on the U.S. and Canada, this research will include Mexico as well. Based on OCA theory this study will consider the notion of adopting a common currency to upgrade or further intensify the original North America Free Trade Agreement. The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 focuses on the economic conditions and criteria based on optimum currency area theory. It also provides a review of the existing literature discussing the benefits and costs of a common currency for the members of NAFTA. Both dollarization and a monetary union are discussed. Section 3 empirically examines both inter-regional and intra-industry trade patterns and trends within NAFTA. Section 4 extends the empirical analysis from section 3 by examining 4 several other OCA criteria. Gross domestic product, trade openness, inflation rates, interest rates, economic growth rates, business cycle synchronization, fiscal and monetary policy coordination, and factor mobility amongst the three member nations are analyzed using correlations. A comparative analysis of NAFTA nations with EMU is also provided. Section 5 conducts some regressions to identify further the benefits of common currency. The final section summarizes the significance of the analysis and provides some policy comments.
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
The decision for geographic regions to economically integrate and adopt a single currency is based on the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), pioneered primarily in seminal works by economist Robert Mundell (1961 ), Ron McKinnon (1963 , and Peter Kenen (1969) . OCA theory describes a set of conditions that would ideally maximize economic efficiency through the adoption of a common currency. Mundell defined an optimum currency area as "an economic unit composed of regions affected symmetrically by disturbances and between which labour and other factors of production flow freely. Traditional OCA theory is defined by these specific characteristics: international factor mobility, degree of openness of the economy, product diversification, financial integration, and similarity of inflation rates.
7 These are addressed next.
Literature on international factor mobility stresses several aspects of factor mobility that significantly contribute to a successful monetary union. Factor mobility is the degree to which factors of production (capital and labor) move freely between countries. A high degree of factor mobility means that labor and capital are easily and efficiently moved across borders. Mundell argues that "factor mobility is the key criterion in the choice [for] or against currency union."
8 Sahin (2006) points out that for countries between which factor mobility is high, the degree of the adjustment in exchange rate risks, such as asymmetric instabilities and price rigidities, is lessened. With a high degree of factor mobility, if a country is subject to a shock, like a recession, then labor can move from one country to another. This helps to alleviate high rates of unemployment in the recession hit nation and allows the country to recover from the shock.
In addition, even when countries do not have similar structures, high factor mobility may make the movement towards a common currency more appealing. 9 (Demopoulos and Yannacopoulos, 2001) . When researching factor mobility, many economists begin by looking specifically at labor. Most economists agree that a high degree of factor mobility, especially labor mobility, are preconditions for an optimum currency area.
In addition to a high degree of factor mobility, OCA theory suggests that economies looking to integrate should also have a high degree of trade openness. DeGrauwe (2007) explains 6
that a highly open economy reduces the probability of asymmetric shocks occurring. 10 If a country's currency depreciates, the aggregate demand for its exports increases and its aggregate demand of imports decreases, which means the country can charge higher prices for their exports and pay higher wages to the workers. An economy with a high degree of trade openness also increases welfare gains associated with the elimination of high transaction costs and decision errors from conducting business with foreign currencies. A highly open economy can use exchange rate policy like depreciation to overcome an adverse shock, such as a recession ( Figure   1 ). The depreciation will raise exports and hence income for the country (from Y 0 to Y 1 ), but at the same time, it will bring inflation. The more open the economy, the higher the price rise. This is costly to the country. But, when a country adopts a common currency, it relinquishes the exchange rate policy. There are greater benefits of adopting a common currency for a more open economy, as the cost of giving up exchange rate policy is low.
Figure 1 Depreciation Overcomes Shocks in Open Economy
McKinnon ( Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 4 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5 http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol4/iss1/5 total domestic goods is large, a fixed exchange rate, as opposed to a flexible exchange rate, is beneficial.
11 Arndt (2003) argues that trade encourages similarity among industrial structures and thus reduces the problems associated with asymmetric shocks. 12 Intra-product specialization reduces asymmetric shocks as it increases business synchronization. Krugman (1993) on the other hand, believes that specialization causes asymmetric shocks among nations because it emphasizes the differences between the nations.
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In addition to product specialization and diversification, OCA theory also stresses the importance of a high degree of financial integration between countries. Although a high degree of financial integration overlaps with the international factor (capital) mobility conditions, a high degree of financial integration incorporates similarities in interest rates. Sahin (2006) argues that, "slight changes in interest rate will give rise to sufficient equilibrating capital flows." The author opines that it acts as an "equilibrating element of payment imbalances." According to Tavlas (1997) financial integration helps to absorb the shocks in the adjustment process in the short run, and eases the overall integration for the long run. 14 A higher degree of financial integration allows for the possibility of maintaining fixed exchange rates. High fiscal integration enables 11 McKinnon states, "Those countries which are major trading partners should maintain a single fixed exchange rate system because continuous exchange rate adjustments are costly and inefficient between economies which are integrated with each other. 12 In the end, the outcome is likely to depend on the relative importance of inter-and intra-industry trade in the integrated area. Where inter-industry trade dominates, as it would in currency unions between industrialized and industrializing countries, greater specialization and hence heightened asymmetry would be the likely result. Where intra-industry trade is dominant, as in the EU, greater specialization is compatible with rising correlation among business cycles, especially if specialization along product-variety lines is prevalent. Specialization in terms of intraindustry product variety ensures that industry-specific shocks affect everybody. 13 
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areas to "smooth diverse shocks through endogenous fiscal transfers from a low unemployment region to a high unemployment region."
In addition to financial integration, countries looking towards a common currency must have similar inflation rates. Literature on the subject identifies the similarity of inflation rates as a desirable outcome because there will be no effect on terms of trade 15 . Other economic conditions include high levels of intra-regional trade among the countries and intra-regional trade relative to a nation's GDP.
North American Monetary Union (NAMU)
When a group of countries shares a common new currency, it is known as a monetary union. For Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. a monetary union differs from dollarization in that the countries would develop a new currency and manage it collectively. A North American
Monetary Union (NAMU) would unite member countries in ways similar to those of the Euro.
They would also have one North American Central Bank.
Thus, Courchene and Harris (2000) explain that an "overarching central bank with a board of directors selected from the still-existing national banks" would be responsible for policy making for all three countries. 16 Several economists and politicians have discussed the emergence of the amero, which would be Canada and the U.S. version of the Euro, in which monetary sovereignty would be jointly shared, and both the U.S. dollar and the Canadian loonie would be replaced. There is an abundance of literature on the U.S. and Canadian monetary 15 Sahin (2006) notes that exceptionally different inflation rates influence the terms of trade between countries as the flow of goods is disrupted, the disequilibrium in the current account grows larger. While Tavlas (1997) , if a country pegs its exchange rate to the currency of a country with a low inflation rate, the monetary policy unification becomes more credible. 16 Courchene, Thomas J. and Richard G. union, however, there is far less written about the inclusion of Mexico in the union. Throughout the literature both the potential benefits and costs for Canada and the U.S. are identified, and to a far less extent, the potential advantages and disadvantages to Mexico are included.
Economists are unclear as to the U.S.'s interest in NAMU, however, there is some speculation. states that U.S. gains associated with reduced transaction costs that "would be fully duplicated by the dollarization alternative."
With the theoretical threat of the Euro to the dollar's role as the international reserve currency, a monetary union would allow the United States to compete on a more level playing field with the Euro. According to Chriszt (2000) , a monetary union would make it easier for the United States to finance its balance-of-payments deficit more easily. Courchene and Harris (2000) agree that "the U.S. would presumably be in favor of a larger formal U.S. dollar area given its proclivity to run current account deficits." However, the authors also argue that the U.S.
would opt for dollarization as opposed to a monetary union as it would allow the country to gain wealth from seigniorage. Grubel (1999) argues in that a monetary union would lead to greater investment and trade opportunities for the U.S. as the NAMU could expand to include other countries including possibly the Central American and Caribbean nations. These countries would benefit from greater stability, which in turn would also allow the United States some relief in "bailouts of countries experiencing severe economic crises by promoting economic growth."
17
Though the benefits to the U.S. seem small, the possibility for NAMU is still significant to some economists. both Canada and Mexico had a choice between a "well-functioning lender-of-last-resort with clear guidelines on how funds will be dispersed to financial institutions facing liquidity problems" 18 and dollarization, both countries would choose the former. Courchene and Harris (2000) agree in that "although dollarization has substantial initial appeal to many countries in the Americas, over the longer term these countries will surely prefer some version of NAMU than dollarization." 19 The authors agree that Canada's financial institutions and structures would be preserved with NAMU.
Grubel (2000) points out that a monetary union for Canada would bring about "static gains" associated with reduced costs of foreign exchanges as well as decreased interest rates and exchange rate risks. 20 The author also notes that there are "dynamic gains" in terms of increased labor market discipline, expansion of trade, and better structured adjustments in Canada. Chriszt (2000) mentions that a great advantage to Canada is that it would not forgo its seigniorage revenue, as it would with dollarization.
21
Seigniorage revenues come as more of a cost than a benefit for the U.S. if it is involved in a monetary union. Though seigniorage revenues would be returned to member nations equally, the U.S. would suffer losses associated with the widespread success of the U.S. dollar as an international currency. The gains from the speculated international use of the amero would be shared with Canada, instead of going directly to the U.S. 19 According to De Grauwe (2007), "The costs of a monetary union derive from the fact that when a country relinquishes its national currency, it also relinquishes an instrument of economic policy, i.e. it loses the ability to conduct a national monetary policy 20 Grubel, "The Merit of a Canada-U.S. Monetary Union," North American Journal of Economics and Finance 11 no.1 (August 2000): 19-40. 22-23. 21 Seignorage is defined by Aurebach and Flores-Quiroga (2003) as "the excess of the nominal value of a currency over its cost of production."
In addition, the U.S. would suffer from "a loss in flexibility of macroeconomic policy in Washington." 22 As the American and Canadian economies unite monetary policy would be constrained because the countries are asymmetric. With asymmetric economies, the business cycles would continue to be unsynchronized, causing instability in both countries. Not only would monetary policy be limited, but fiscal policy would be restricted as both economies tighten policy to less budget deficits.
Economists disagree as to whether or not Canada's economy would face the same problem with the constraint of both monetary and fiscal policies. Gilbert (2007) explains that opponents of NAMU are concerned in that such a union "would disadvantage Canada because of the asymmetry of the Canada-U.S. relationship." 23 Grubel (2000) also addresses the losses in monetary policy, interest and exchange rate polices associated with a monetary union, as he believes they are rooted in a loss in national sovereignty for Canada. Alternatively, Grubel (2000), and Courchene and Harris (2000) see that asymmetric shocks would not be costly to either the U.S. or Canada. Courchene and Harris (2000) explain that adjustments to shocks and exchange rates would be addressed in other ways, "via changes in prices and wages, and internal migration, among other avenues." Although many of the economists referred to above identify some of the potential costs of a common currency, the works by Chriszt (2000), Courchene and Harris (2000), Grubel (2000) , and Arndt (2003) institutions for ensuring political accountability of a North American Central Bank means that NAMU is unlikely to happen and that, if it were to happen, it is unlikely to survive." 24 Carr and Floyd (2002) , identify that sources of exchange rate volatility are real shocks and not monetary, and both the U.S. and Canada are subject to asymmetric shocks. Thus the adoption of a common currency would be highly unfavorable to Canada.
25
For Mexico, issues of loss in fiscal and monetary policy are certainly a possibility, though the literature has failed to discuss specific costs to the country. Chriszt (2000) argues that costs rise with regards to the interest premium, defined as the "amount of interest a country must pay above U.S. rates on the international market for issuing debt." The interest premium may be a significant cost to Mexican borrowers and a large obstacle in Mexico's long-term economic goals as the country is still developing.
26
Though there are apparent benefits and costs to each country involved in NAMU, economists have disagreed over many of the effects. Many economists agree that the United
States is better off without a monetary union, though dollarization seems to hold more advantages than a monetary union. For Canada, economists recognize that the benefits far outweigh the costs, but there is still some uncertainty. The advantages and disadvantages for 26 To Mexican borrowers the interest premium is costly. For long-term planning and investment for the Mexican economy, the interest premium is a major obstacle as the Mexican government is working towards reducing the level and instability of the interest rate premium. costs savings from a common currency are largely significant, while for domestically oriented firms may bear macroeconomic adjustment costs. As a result of lower transaction costs, Mexican banks may also benefit. 27 Those who would be adversely affected due to increased foreign competition are domestically oriented firms, service industries and some Mexican bankers and financial executives.
Section 3 next analyzes intra-NAFTA trade patterns over the last quarter century.
NAFTA Intra-Regional Trade Analysis

Intra-NAFTA Trade
High levels of intra-regional trade will reap the benefits of a currency union as exchange rate uncertainties and risks are eliminated and countries save on transaction costs. High levels intra-regional trade between members of NAFTA also suggests that business cycles will be synchronized and that the countries are likely to be subject to symmetric shocks. However, the total share of trade has hovered around 76 percent. This relatively high percentage 27 Benefits to Mexican bankers may be attributed to intensified direct competition with foreign banks for providing low-cost loans for capital, and increased encounters with nonperforming loans in a downturn. Y e a r 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 (1)
where X i is the exports of product i by Country A to Country B, M i is the imports of good i from Country B to Country A, X is the total exports of all goods to Country B, and M is the total imports of all goods from Country B.
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The Grubel-Lloyd indices for some industries-motor vehicles, motor vehicles parts and accessories, computer equipment, computer equipment parts and accessories, and aircraft for Canada and the United States are shown in Table 1 . 29 The The business cycles for computer equipment parts and accessories for Mexico and the U.S. may be somewhat synchronized as the indices are nearly 1. Television business cycles are the least synchronized, or maybe not synchronized at all, as the indices are closer to 0.
Empirical Examination of OCA Criteria
Section 4 examines the degree of factor mobility within NAFTA. Then it uses correlation analysis to study business cycle synchronization in NAFTA. Finally, it also takes a comparative perspective and evaluates members of NAFTA and members of EMU for the extent of similarity 30 Motor vehicle parts are imported by Canada from the U.S. are used in making a motor vehicle which is then exported back to the U.S. in the economic development, economic growth, trade openness, and interest rate and tax revenue.
Labor and Capital Mobility
High degrees of factor mobility, specifically capital and labor mobility, are conducive to countries forming a currency union. High degrees of factor mobility allow countries to adjust to shocks by moving factors, instead of depending on exchange rate changes or exchange rate policy.
Capital mobility within NAFTA is measured by the extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from the U.S. into Canada and Mexico. Following Goto and Hamada (1994) , the share of labor inflow of foreign workers in the total U.S. labor force is used to measure labor mobility. 31 The inflow of Canadians and Mexicans into the U.S. labor force is shown in Table 3 . 32 The 
GDP, IPI, and Interest Rate Correlations
Similarities in GDP and industrial production indices are suitable measures for business cycle synchronization as both are measurements of the member nations having similar trends in economic booms and recessions. Data used in section 4.2 is taken from IMF's IFS database. Table 4 shows GDP correlations for Canada and the U.S., the U.S. and Mexico, and Canada and Mexico. The statistical significance of the coefficient is measured by the t-statistic, which is shown in parentheses below the coefficient. The U.S.'s GDP is positively correlated to The Industrial Production Index (IPI) measures the level of physical output for a country.
High levels of correlation also reflect more business cycle synchronization. The IPI correlations for each country pair is shown in for each country pair are relatively close to +1, thus indicating that each NAFTA country has similar industrial production output to that of its partners. Again the correlations are statistically significant. 
NAFTA vs. EMU
Countries with similar levels of economic development and growth and trade openness find it easier to form a currency union. Countries with similar interest rates imply they are following relatively similar monetary policies. This helps in pursuing currency and monetary integration. Tax to GDP ratios are appropriate indicators for tax structures. Countries with similar tax structures find it easier to form a monetary union because they will also have similar rates of inflation. Finally, similarity of government debt/GDP ratios implies similarity in fiscal policy among nations. This section compares GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rates, trade openness, interest rates, tax/GDP ratios, and government debt/GDP ratios for members of EMU and NAFTA for 2001.
To better understand the likelihood that NAFTA will form a monetary union it is necessary to compare the above economic indicators discussed earlier for NAFTA against those for EMU. The standard deviations of these variables are useful in comparing similarity in these economic parameters between members of EMU and NAFTA. However, NAFTA has a lower standard deviation of tax to GDP ratios at 1.53 percent compared to the EMU at 4.21 percent. As tax to GDP ratios are good indicators of inflation rates, countries with similar tax to GDP ratios find it easier to maintain similar inflation rates. The low standard deviation for NAFTA may mean that inflation rates are similar between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico and may make it easier to form a monetary union.
Government debt to GDP ratios are useful in determining similarities in fiscal policies between countries. NAFTA has a higher standard deviation of 3.51 percent than EMU at 2.59 percent.
NAFTA has lower standard deviations than EMU for the following variables: GDP per capita growth, trade openness, and tax to GDP ratios. This means that members of NAFTA are more similar than members of EMU in these areas for year 2001.
Econometric Analysis within NAFTA
Section 5 uses regression analysis to determine the relationships between intra-regional trade, GDP, FDI, and exchange rates amongst the NAFTA nations. The first part describes the sources of data and explains the construction of the different variables such as gross domestic product, industrial production indices, exchange rates, and money supply (M2) growth rates. The second part identifies the regression equations and hypothesizes the expected signs of the coefficients. The results of the regressions are discussed in the final part.
Data and Variable Construction
Three 
The data is modified to construct the variables used in the regression. First, to determine the volatility of the exchange rate, the GDP and IPI for each country, quarterly data is converted to logs. Next, the difference between the logs is squared and summed by the quarter. Finally, the summed logs are divided by two and square rooted. Volatility is measured by standard deviation.
Exchange rate volatility is also a measure of exchange rate uncertainty and exchange rate risk. Raw quarterly FDI data from USBEA is converted into logs before it is used to run the regressions. Exchange rate volatility is measured as described above, and GDP growth is measured by calculating the percent change from one quarter to the next.
Imports and exports between the U.S.-Canada and the U.S.-Mexico is summed to get a figure for total trade. Trade data available in value is divided by the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) to get trade data in terms of volume, not dollars. The series is then converted into logs.
A two-stage dummy variable is used in the GDP and IPI regression set as well as in the trade regressions. The purpose of the dummy variable is to capture the effect of free trade agreements in North America. The dummy variable assigns the number 0 to those data from 1980 to 1988 (before any free trade agreement was formed), value of 1 to the data from 1989Q1 to 1993Q4 (when the US and Canada formed the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement [CUSTA]), and 2 to data post 1994Q1 after Mexico joined the free trade agreement that is now NAFTA.
Macroeconomic Instability and Exchange Rate Volatility
The first set of regression equations that measure GDP and IPI volatility of both Mexico and Canada with the U.S. are as follows:
Volatility of country i's GDP = a 0 + a 1 (volatility of currency of country i with respect to U.S. dollar) + a 2 (volatility of U.S. GDP) + a 3 (country i's money supply growth) + a 4 (FTA dummy) The first regression equation for Canada's GDP volatility has three significant variables.
The exchange rate and U.S. GDP volatility and Canada's M2 growth rate are significant at ten, These results show that the magnitude of exchange rate volatility affects Mexico's macro-economy to a greater extent than Canada's. 35 Von Furstenberg (2006) , using a foreign exchange regime dummy variable, finds that exchange rate volatility positively and significantly affects Mexico's GDP volatility, while Canada's GDP volatility is insignificantly affected by CAD-USD volatility over the period 1950-2003. The following trade regression are used in measuring the extent to which GDP and exchange rate volatility affect trade between the U.S. and Canada, and the U.S. and Mexico: log(U.S. trade with country i) = c 0 + c 1 (volatility of country i's currency with U.S. dollar) + c 2 log(real U.S. GDP) + c 3 log(real GDP i ) +c 4 (FTA dummy) This last regression for Mexico suggests that exchange rate fluctuations are inimical to trade with the U.S. given Mexico has already joined NAFTA. As such, from a policy perspective, such fluctuations can be reduced by moving towards a common currency.
Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment regression are run with and without the dummy variable using 
Conclusion
The present study examines the economic feasibility of NAFTA nations adopting a common currency. Certain results warrant summarizing.
Firstly, both Canada and Mexico have high levels of intra-regional trade and trade openness. This is consistent with the OCA criteria as highly open economies reduce the probability of asymmetric shocks and reduce the costs of adopting a common currency. The United States, on the other hand, does not fulfill these OCA criteria because the country has low levels of intra-regional trade with NAFTA members as well as low trade openness.
Secondly, intra-industry trade indices demonstrate that U.S.-Canada business cycles are synchronized for aircraft and motor vehicles while U.S.-Mexico business cycles are somewhat synchronized for computer equipment parts and accessories. Fifthly, compared to EMU members, NAFTA nations are more similar for GDP per capita growth, trade openness, and tax to GDP ratios (and inflation rates, and in turn, supply shocks) than members of EMU. NAFTA members are not as similar to each other as EMU members in terms of GDP per capita (economic growth similarity), interest rates (capturing monetary policy similarity), and government debt to GDP ratios (measuring fiscal policy similarity).
Sixthly, the econometric results show that bilateral exchange rate volatility leads to macroeconomic instability in both Mexico and Canada. From a policy perspective one way of bringing macroeconomic stability is by reducing exchange rate fluctuations through a common currency. For both Canada and Mexico, bilateral trade flows with the U.S. are negatively affected by exchange rate volatility. Mexico's FDI flows are also adversely affected by peso-USD volatility.
For NAFTA, a common currency is eventually feasible given all its benefits; however, the member nations must also investigate certain political aspects of adopting a common currency.
The most discussed political issue in regard to adopting a common currency is the country's compromised monetary sovereignty. Cohen (2003) argues that Direct political benefits are derived from a strictly national currency: first, a potential political symbol to promote a sense of national identity; second, a potentially powerful source of revenue to underwrite public expenditures; and third, a practical means to insulate the nation from foreign influence or constraint.
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Countries looking to form a currency union must first consider the benefits of a national currency and the costs associated with giving up national identity. Labor mobility between the U.S.-
Mexico is an area of concern both economically and politically. This in-depth economic analysis demonstrates that a common currency is certainly possible, given the benefits that are discussed in this study. It is economically feasible for NAFTA to move towards a common currency, but this venture depends on political readiness and solidarity among NAFTA nations.
